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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950665-CA

:
:

Priority Tin ~

v.
LARRY HELQUIST
Defendant
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NATURE 0F

PROCEEDING

This 1.3 an apoe-i' from an OrdeT* - :: *;he Seventh Mstrict Court
date'?
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This Court gra^tc: Defendant s Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
pursuant

"-•

' f~'^ -'*•*- RUioc

Cr-i-

-

"•roeilaic riucedure by
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
The follow—--; * ssues are presented on Appeal:
1

dispatcher g^/e tze

Is
officer reasonable suspicion re inquire further

with r^gar^ * - *"•"-• ~ ^-UTstsn-e? surround": nq the Defendant?
2

......

. : . i: , given the weather

circumstances ana location of :;:e st..;^ , to request the Defendant to

accompany him to the lobby of the Public Safety Building for the
purpose of giving him a field sobriety test?
a reasonable detention?

Was this an arrest or

Was it beyond the scope of the original

stop, or does it matter?
The Court of Appeals reviews the factual finding underlying
the Trial Court's decision on a Motion to Suppress under the
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 279 Utah Adv. Rep. 11
(Utah, 1995).

State v. Brown, 853 P 2d. 851, 854 (Utah 1992).

The

Court will find clear error only if it decides that the factual
findings made by the Trial Court are not adequately supported by
the record.

State v. Pena, 869 P 2d. 932, 935-936, (Utah 1994).

In addition, the Court of Appeals considers the facts in the light
most favorable to the Trial Court's determination.

However, the

Court of Appeals reviews the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law based
on such facts under a correctness standard.

State v. Ramirez, 817

P 2d. 774, 781-782, (Utah 1991), "according no deference to its
legal conclusions.
trial court,"

But affording a measure of discretion to the

State v. Spurqeon, 904 P 2d. 220, 225, (Utah App.

1995).
Ill
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides [Section
14]
unreasonable searches forbidden-issuance of a
warrant•
Text;
- ... . as
Constitution*

Amendment

Form

of

the

United

Sra".-.;

I V"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant war3

"harged with divine

Annotated, 1953 a- amendec
aqe preset"

- r^-.~

.: \

-*- tip influence of

J person unaer sixteen years or

a Misdemeanor.

Defendant filed =» Met•on t~<

c

the result: :: nis :;eid sobriety tes:? ^:ic

inythinc flowing from

the o^fi^ov-'s discussion wiui cue ucienaanL ui his conduct.
Ler^n^ant asserts that the report from the own^r or cl .
the store
Trc~r~r

vi\.i regard to h :i s condition, wa: insufficient for - h^
establish

reasonable

suspicic

-

•-

uhe

car.

Deter^dnL lurtner asserts that the T-pqiiPQf '

,.. .:ccper to take

the

*

Defendant

five

blocks

t: the

ub.:c

Safety

thereby the condu:r :td result cf the field sobriety tests, and the

Tne trial c^^it ^enied the Mct..^
Defendant took this interlocutory appeal.

3

r uiess

from, which the

V
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts recited below are drawn from

the Trial Court's

Findings of Fact and the transcript of the hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress and are recited in the light most favorable to
the Trial Court's Findings. State v. Pena, 869 P 2d. 932, 935-936,
(Utah 1994), State v. Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1996).
On January 7th, 1996, the San Juan County Sheriff's Office
dispatch received a call from an employee or owner of Blue Mountain
Foods (Court's finding No. 3, 4, and 5 ) , reporting an altercation
between the check-out person or store owner (T. pg. 5, lines 10-14)
and a person who was obviously intoxicated.

Trooper

Randall

received information that there was a strong odor of alcohol (T.
pg. 5, line 17), that the store personnel believed the person to be
drunk (T. pg. 5, line 19), and a description of the car as a small
red vehicle (T. pg. 6, line 10). Request was made that the officers
not respond or apprehend the person within the store
line 3-5).

(T. pg. 6,

The second officer, Trooper Hall, also heard the

dispatch and believed that the management of Blue Mountain Foods
had called and given the information

(T. pg 13, line 3 ) .

He

described the circumstance as a customer under the influence of
alcohol (T. pg 13, line 5 ) , with a strong odor of alcohol about him
(T. pg 13, line 5 ) , who had been in a fight with the store clerk
(T. pg.13,

line

7).

Trooper Hall understood

that the

store

personnel did not want the person confronted in the store (T pg.13,
line 8) and the individual was driving a little red car (T. pg 13,
4

nl

line

Trooper

Randall

app xoached

the parkinc

Mountain Foods a nd noticed only one red ~-'~
I Il

in Il"'i|

I "ll|

;

!! ;t of Blue

n *"'~-* r ? . r k i ~ ~

"' " .

'L'lie Trooper wen t: t: :: • the •-.. . „i i.-~ c „ c - :.. n-a:-;^

d U-t.urn and Decame stuck

(T. p g . 6, line 2 5 ) . Trooper

Randall

radioed Trooper Hall to make the stop and Trooper H a n r -cceeded to
Blue Mountain toods f stopped h i s car up the street so tnau he could
observe the parking let: and watched Mr. Heiquist exit the store and
enter the sma^

z~~~l positioner

Trooper
could

not leave

Trc
thfc

:ed cai (i.

tie parking

v..«•-

i -~ *.ioiic.

of trie drive:
b e :

lot: and

approach

* •

" ''
.-',J.OILVJ

.. , ^dcrci J ^ , where M r . Heiquist

'

„ - -..

line 4 • *

*

•

-. •

-

Ran-i^;/

-•

a".u ^iiiired speecn

While t h ^ requested items w e r e

•

told Trooper Rcanaal^ "what: they haa
over to Trooper

. •:>-- vehicle.

.

:

an-,: \_. :ed tue investigation

',.;*•* "rocp^r Ha

assist inr*.

Trooper

I *
Jot .is he we;:*", t

* .

iround
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talking
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•i

•

he n&ii had any aiccn:- L , M r . Heiquist stated r ,.*.\ he r :i r;a-i fiur or
five beers

"

'. *

^-~

;

. /^ "*~1 *- O^fi^ 0 7 " 3 had orevi^'is^" ^ *-"•> --
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store employees
S"*:~P
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'

t-r:r-p

inside the store/ and because of the snowy
-

-v

•--T lot, Trooper Randall felt that

and
n

-- - ., field sobriety test i n t h e parking
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lot

(T.

pg

8,

line

5-8).

Trooper

Randall

explained

this

circumstance to Mr. Helquist, who then requested that he be allowed
to go to his home to be given the field sobriety tests (T.pg 8,
line 12). Trooper Randall and Trooper Hall made arrangements for
Trooper

Hall to

stay with the car and the Defendant's

young

daughter until Trooper Randall could conduct the field sobriety
tests in the lobby of the Public Safety Building (T. pg 26, line
22).

Officer Randall placed Defendant in the patrol car, drove him

five blocks (T pg. 28, line 16,) to the Public Safety Building.
The Defendant was in the patrol vehicle with no handcuffs (T. pg.
33, line 10) in the front seat with the officer (T. pg 33, line
14), and he consented to go to the Public Safety Building (T. 33,
line 20) . The Court found that the Court had him in custody and it
was a level 2 transport, (pg 49, line 8-21), asserting that the
Trooper was taking him to the building for field sobriety purposes
and had a right to do so.
The Defendant failed his field sobriety tests and Trooper
Randall radioed Trooper Hall that Defendant had failed the field
sobriety tests and would be placed under arrest (T. pg 34, line
12).

Trooper Hall had waited at his vehicle with the Defendant's

daughter in the parking lot of Blue Mountain Food and upon hearing
that the Defendant

had failed the field sobriety tests, made

arrangements to tow the vehicle and took the groceries and the
daughter to her home (T. pg 35, line 15-23).

The arrest for DUI

was made at the Public Safety Building (T. pg. 27, line 18).

6

The Court found that Mr. Helquist was not under arrest when he
was brought to the lobby of the Public Safety Building to perform
the field sobriety tests (F of F. par. 19). The Court found that
Troopers Randall and Hall, by virtue of the call made to the
Sheriff's Office and the description of the individual and his
activities at Blue Mountain Foods, had reasonable suspicion to make
the original stop and to do additional testing to check whether the
occupant was under the influence (F of F Par. 21).
VI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court properly determined that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant based upon the telephone
call from an employee or owner of Blue Mountain Foods reporting the
altercation which had occurred in the store,

that Defendant was

obviously intoxicated, that there was a strong odor of alcohol, and
that he was "drunk".
person

and

a

The store personnel gave the gender of the

description

of

individual not be confronted

the

car

requested

in the store.

observed only one small red vehicle when
lot.

and

that

the

Trooper Randall

he drove by the parking

The Trooper had reasonable suspicion to believe that the

occupant of the red vehicle was the person who had the difficulties
within the store.
identity

was

The informants were not confidential; their

communicated

by dispatch.

This

gave

additional

reliability to the report sufficient for the Troopers to have
reasonable suspicion to stop and inquire further.

Upon inquiry,

the Troopers observed the individual driving the vehicle to have
7

slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol about him.

Defendant

additionally gave an indication to the Troopers that he had had
four to five beers.
reasonable

Based upon these indications, the Trooper had

suspicion

intoxicated.

to

believe

the

Defendant

was

indeed

It was reasonable for the officer to find a suitable

place to conduct the field sobriety test that would make the
results of the tests fair to the Defendant.
It was not unreasonable for the Trooper to take the Defendant
to a neutral place, to wit:
Building,

which

was

five

The lobby of the Public

blocks

from

this

location.

Safety
The

conditions in the parking lot on this day were slushy and wet, to
the extent that one of the Highway Patrolmen became stuck trying to
turn around.

Whether Mr. Helquist was arrested at this point or

not, the Trooper still had the right to take Mr. Helquist to a
suitable, neutral location for the conducting of a field sobriety
test.

Mr. Helquist failed the field sobriety tests and was placed

under arrest.
The Trooper was within his rights to transport the individual
to this location and to conduct the additional tests based upon his
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Helquist may be intoxicated and may
be driving under the influence of alcohol.
The Trial Court was right in denying the Motion to Suppress
and therefore, this Court should uphold the decision of the Trial
Court to deny the suppression motion.
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VII
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
TROOPER'S HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.
A stop is justified if there is reasonable suspicion that the
defendant is involved in criminal activity (Utah Code Annotated,
Section 77-7-15f (1990).

While the required level of suspicion is

lower than the standard for probable cause for arrest, the same
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to determine
if there are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support
reasonable suspicion.
App.

State v. Case, 884 P 2d. 1274, 1276, (Utah

1994), (Quoting: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 21, United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, (1989) Accord, State v. Bello,
871 P 2d. 584, 587 (Ut. App. 1994), State v. Stricklinq, 844 P 2d.
983 (Utah App. 1992) .
In our case the reasonable suspicion for the stop is based on
the information given

Trooper Randall and Trooper Hall from the

San Juan County Sheriff's Office Dispatch.

In accordance with the

above standards, did the totality of the facts and circumstances
expressed to the Troopers support a reasonable suspicion?

In Case,

Id., the Utah Court of Appeals overturned the investigative stop of
an automobile where the Court indicated "no legally sufficient,
reasonable

suspicion

exists in the

absence

of a

demonstrated

factual basis for the issuing department's information." Case, Id.
at 1279.

The Court was concerned because the Officer's had merely
9

received

descriptive

information

about

the

vehicle

and

a

description of the possible suspect, but no information had been
given to support any reasonable suspicion for or the necessity for
the stop.

There was no source of information from which the

officer could determine that a crime had been committed or was
likely to be committed.
Another recent case from the Utah Court of Appeals has visited
the issue of when reasonable suspicion can be obtained through a
dispatch report.

In State v. Nguyen,

878 P 2d. 1183, (Utah App.

1994), a Utah County dispatcher had received information about
individuals in a vehicle who had been trying to sell large amounts
of quarters to businesses in Spanish Fork Canyon.

An attempt to

locate call (ATL) relayed the following information: (1) the color
and possible make of the car driven by suspects; (2) an accurate
license plate number; (3) the race and gender of the suspects; (4)
the direction the vehicle was heading; (5) details of the suspects
conduct attempting to sell large amounts of quarter wrapped in
yellow note paper;

(6) several business operator's reports of

concerns about their encounter with suspect; and (7) reports of the
recent burglary in Price. Note that none of these items constitute
illegal activity.

However, the Court found that such information

could reasonably lead an officer to conclude, based on a totality
of the circumstances that criminal activity may be afoot and the
Court of Appeals therefore held that the trial court did not error
in

determining

that

law

enforcement

10

officials

had

reasonable

suspicion justifying the stop of defendant's vehicle.

The Court

further holding:
"...the conduct observed and/or the information relied
upon need not be legal or describe illegal activity in
order to give a law enforcement officer reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity so long as the officer can
articulate facts which form the basis for his or her
suspicion.
(State v. Menke, 787 P 2d. 537, 541, (Ut.
App. 1990)."
Nguyen at 1186.
Like Nguyen, the Troopers in this case had information that
business

owners

defendant.
a

high

had

reported

suspicious

activities

of

the

Information from citizen informants is generally given

degree

of

reliability.

Reliability

and

veracity

are

generally assumed when the informant receives nothing from the
police in exchange for the information.
1205, 1208 (Ut. App. 1993).

State v. Blaha, 851 P 2d.

(Quoting State v. Purser, 828 P 2d.

515, 517, (Ut. App. 1992)),
"In other cases, if the circumstances as a whole
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report,
a less strong showing is required, Id. at 1205-1206."
(Purser at 517).
Reliability

and

veracity

are

generally

assumed

when

the

informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in
exchange for the information. Quoting other cases, the Courts have
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the
informant's knowledge is based on personal observation."
v. Brown, 798 P 2d.

284 at 286, (Ut. App 1990)

In State

the Court said:

"Courts view the testimony of citizen informers with less
rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police informers.
State v. Treadwav, 499 P 2d. 846, 848, (Ut. 1972). In
State v. Miller, 740 P 2d at 1364 (Ct. App. 1987)
statements in the search warrants were based on
information from defendant's neighbors. The Court noted
that vthe average neighbor witness is not the type of
11

informant in need of independent proof of reliability or
veracity" Id. at 1366; see State v. Harris, 671, P 2d.
175, 180, (Ut. 1983). This is because citizen informers,
unlike police informers, volunteer information out of
concern for the community and not for personal benefit."
In our circumstance both of the Troopers, who heard
dispatch report and responded to the scene, testified.

the

Trooper

Randall testified that (1) the report had been made by an employee
or owner of Blue Mountain Foods; (2) that the customer had been in
an altercation with the store clerk; (3) that the customer was
obviously intoxicated;

(4)

alcohol about the person;
person "drunk";

(6)

that there was a strong odor of

(5) that the store personnel deemed the

the gender of the individual; (7) the color

and description of the car; and (8) that the store personnel did
not want a response inside the store.

Officer Hall heard the same

dispatch report, reported in much the same fashion, and testified
that he heard the indication that the customer was under the
influence of alcohol and that there was strong odor of alcohol
about the individual.

Trooper Randall testified that as he drove

by the parking lot, he observed very few cars in the parking lot,
and only one small red car. Trooper Hall testified that he stopped
up the street from the parking lot and observed a male subject
enter a small red car within the parking lot.
In State v. Roth, 827 P 2d. 255, the dispatcher had informed
the investigating officer of a "drunk driver", provided the gender
of the individual, a description and the color of the automobile,
the license number and the vehicle's location. The information had
been transmitted by the University Medical Center Security Office,
12

which had identified itself to the dispatcher. Unlike an anonymous
informant, this gave the information additional reliability and is
similar to our case where the individuals identified themselves.
Like in Roth, Trooper Hall's own observation of the individual
entering

the

report.

In Roth, the Officer had far less information, yet the

Court upheld

small

red

vehicle

corroborated

the

dispatcher's

reasonable suspicion, justifying the approach of the

defendant by the officers, stating:
"However, in the case at bar, the dispatcher did indeed
communicate a factual foundation for the dispatch,
specifically the existence of a drunk driver along with
the description of the driver's vehicle, license number
and location. The specific factual foundation provided
in the dispatch equipped the arresting officer with
sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Roth's car."
The holding in Roth is particularly applicable to our case
where the Court stated:
"In sum, Officer Bradfield had reasonable suspicion to
make the stop of Roth's vehicle.
Where as, here, a
reliable source with reasonable suspicion based on
articulated facts reports the commission of a crime,
based on the relayed facts the dispatcher communicates
the information to police and the responding officer's
own observation corroborate the dispatch, we find that
reasonable suspicion exists for the stop."
The finding that the Troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop
the Defendant's vehicle should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TROOPERS DETENTION OF MR. HELQUIST AND
REQUEST THAT HE BE TAKEN TO THE LOBBY OF THE
PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING TO CONDUCT THE FIELD
SOBERITY TESTS WERE REASONABLE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

13

In addition to the information which the Troopers had in order
to find reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, they testified
that they could smell the strong odor of alcohol coming from the
person of Mr. Helquist at the time they were making the decision to
take Mr. Helquist to the Public Safety Building for the purpose of
conducting

field

soberity

tests

(T. pg. 7, line

23).

Also,

Defendant told Trooper Randall that he had had four to five beers
(T. pg 8, line 2 ) , and the Troopers noted that Defendant's speech
was slurred (T. pg 14, line 4 ) .

These additional factors gave the

Troopers probable cause to arrest Mr. Helquist for drunk driving,
without the necessity of performing the field sobreity test.

The

fact

his

that

impression,

the

Trooper

stated

in

his

testimony

that,

in

Mr. Helquist had not been placed under arrest at this

time does not matter if the Trooper was otherwise legally justified
to place Defendant under arrest at that time.

This principal is

set forth in State v. Spurqeon, 904 P 2d. 220, 228, (Ut. App.
1995), wherein the Court stated,

quoting Scott v. United States,

436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, (1978):
"The fact that the officer does not have the state of
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provided
the legal justification for the officer's action, does
not invalidate the action taken, so long as the
circumstance is viewed objectively to justify that
action."
(Accord State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d. 1127, 1137
(Utah 1994).
The state of mind of the Trooper as to whether Mr. Helquist
was under arrest at the time simply does not matter.
Lopezr as quoted in Spurqeon, stated:
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The Court in

"The Fourth Amendment simply does not require
officer's state of mind to perfectly correspond
his/her legally justified actions."
It

is

clear

that

the

Trooper

was

legally

an
to

justified

in

arresting Mr. Helquist, given the information which has been above
enumerated.

His actions in taking Mr. Helquist to the Public

Safety Building can be justified as being incident to arrest,
thereby there is no impermissible detention.
Arguing alternatively, that Mr. Helquist was not placed under
arrest at this time, what does reasonable suspicion allow the
officer to do with respect to conducting additional inquiry to
determine if probable cause can be obtained?
The Court has made a finding in this case that this was a
level two stop.

The Court has found at Finding 21, that the

Trooper had the right to make additional tests to check whether the
occupant was under
Helquist's

the influence.

transportation

to

the

The Court
Public

found that Mr.

Safety

Building

was

consensual and that he was not under arrestf indicating that he was
placed in the front seat of the patrol car, that he was not
handcuffed, and that the indicia of arrest were not present.
Officer testified

that, in his belief, the conditions

The

in the

parking lot at Blue Mountain Foods were not fair to the Defendant.
In other words,

the

snowy, slushy conditions within the parking

lot would not have given Mr. Helquist a fair opportunity to pass
the tests.

Therefore, the Court found at Finding 23, it was not

unreasonable for the Trooper to accompany Defendant to the Public
Safety Building to perform the test.
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A Trooper having reasonable suspicion may conduct a brief
inquiry into the circumstances involving the defendant in order to
determine whether the crime has been committed.
State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) states:
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention s must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop' Florida v. Royer 460
U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L 3d. 2d 229
(1983).
Both the slength and [the] scope1
of the
detention must be vstrictly tied to and justified by 1
the
circumstances
which
rendered
its
initiation
permissible1" State v. Johnson 805 P 2d 761, 763 (Utah
1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.
Ct. at 1887). Also quoted in State v. Parker 834 P 2d
592 (Utah App. 1992) (State v. Godina-Luna 826 P 2d 652,
654, (Utah App. 1992) )
If reasonable suspicion exists, the officer is authorized to
detain based

on the totality

of the circumstances

officer at the time of the stop.

facing

the

Lopez at 1132. The officer must

"^diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it
[is] necessary to detain the defendant'" (State v. Grovier 808 P 2d
133, 136 (Ut. App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe 420 U.S.
675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985))
In Grovier the officers took 90 minutes to conduct their
investigation.

The Court stated that the focus is not on the time

taken, but "rather the focus is upon the means used by the officers
to dispel their suspicions".

In this analysis the Supreme Court

has chosen not to define a bright-line rule, but has stated "common
sense

and

ordinary

human

experience

criteria" (Sharpe at 685.)
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must

govern

over

rigid

It was reasonable to take Mr. Helquist to the Public Safety
Building to diligently pursue the investigation and to confirm or
dispel suspicion.

This course of action was simpler and faster

than trying to determine what other facilities might be available.
This was common sense and within the Trooper's discretion and was
reasonable under the circumstances.
The decision of the District Court to deny Defendant's Motion
to Suppress should be upheld.

VII
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons

this

Court

should

uphold

the

decision of the Trial Court on its ruling to deny suppression of
the evidence.
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29th

DAY OF MAY, 1996.

Craig C. Halls
San Juaa County Attorney
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